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The thesis aims to reflect on the technical aspects of the Blockchain and Ethereum Smart Contract 
Vulnerabilities. The thesis has provided an in-depth overview of blockchain technologies, focused on 
Bitcoin, Ethereum needed to understand for vulnerabilities in blockchain. Application of 
cryptographic functions, consensus algorithm is explained and Blockchain security vulnerabilities are 
presented. A summary of public and private blockchains are shown, how these differ from each other 
and what are the use cases for these various blockchain application is provided. Ethereum Smart 
Contract are introduced and explained. The vulnerabilities present in smart contract are researched 
empirically.  
The second half of thesis is focused on finding security flaws and vulnerabilities on Ethereum Smart 
contract. The attack vectors that are possible, cyber-attacks which has already happened and how can 
they be mitigated, if found, are presented. Analysis and comparison of popular Ethereum Smart 
Contract Vulnerability detection tools has been empirically studied using an automated tool called 
SmartBugs and the results are presented. 
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Ethereum is worlds’ largest Smart Contract Blockchain Platform1, second in the Market Capital[1]. 
Smart contracts hold Million Euros worth of Ether, a native cryptocurrency to Ethereum platform. Smart 
contracts can be executed by other smart contracts and are used for performing the transactions 
autonomously. The biggest security risk that Ethereum Smart Contract possess, is they are immutable 
by nature once deployed to the blockchain. They cannot be patched anymore, thus any vulnerabilities in 
the contract will cause a massive financial loss. Ethereum Smart contracts are written in a language 
called Solidity and compiled to bytecode that Ethereum Virtual Machine(EVM) executes[2][3]. The 
main objective of the research in this thesis is to figure out what smart contract vulnerabilities are, what 
are the causes of these vulnerabilities and what state-of-art tools exist to find and analyze these 
vulnerabilities.  
 
The motivation of the research is to understand Smart Contract security which are used by Decentralized 
Autonomous Organizations (DAO), Decentralized financing (Defi) etc., that relies heavily, if not 
completely, on smart contracts of Ethereum. Thus, the author of such smart contract codes might find 
this research helpful to recognize and mitigate security vulnerabilities. On top of it, this research 
introduced the fundamental application of Cryptography in blockchain to establish a secured 
decentralized network. The security risks and flaws involved in blockchain has also been researched in 
this thesis. The research has also presented different blockchain technologies, primarily Bitcoin and 
Ethereum, and mentioned different cases of cyber-attacks made to the Blockchain providers or 
Blockchain system itself. 
 
The researcher of the thesis, found out that the current trend of Blockchain solutions based on Ethereum 
and wide application of the Ethereum blockchain, has severe security implications [3]. The work of this 
research is based on earlier research trail of academics and scholars with the pointers they have provided 
for future work. The target audience for this research are security researchers, who would like to 
understand the security implications of Smart contracts and Smart Contract developers who would like 




1 According to coinmarketcap.com, a major website that shows daily trading volume of various 




1.1 Research methodology and questions: 
 
Two approaches have been taken for the research. One of the methods is literature and articles review 
related to the field of Blockchain Security and Smart Contract Vulnerabilities. From most of the articles 
reviewed and inspiration mostly from [3], [4] information has been gathered for further investigation on 
vulnerabilities of Smart Contract in Ethereum and the state-of-art tools that help to analyze these 
vulnerabilities. Second approach of experimentation on the analysis tools with carefully selected dataset 
that covers all the vulnerabilities of Ethereum Smart contracts, named as Decentralized Application 
Security Project or DASP10. Both methodologies applied in this thesis research aims at the following 
objectives: 
1) To find vulnerabilities in blockchain and Ethereum Smart contract 
2) To introduce the state-of-art of the tools available to analyze Smart Contract 
Vulnerabilities in Ethereum 
3) To compare the tools and find out their similarities, differences, and the vulnerabilities 
they can detect 
 
The thesis is structured in such a way that it will introduce all the necessary topics needed to dive into 
Ethereum Smart Contract Vulnerabilities which is the main topic of the research of this paper. Chapter 
2 introduces the blockchain, architecture of blockchain and cryptographic concepts used in blockchain. 
In Chapter 3, cryptocurrencies are explained with major focus on Bitcoin and Ethereum. Chapter 3 
also introduces Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), Solidity (A programming language used to write 
smart contracts) and Smart contract code is explained. Chapter 4 delves with the summary of security 
issues and vulnerabilities of blockchain, their effects on Blockchain. Chapter 4 also introduces security 
issues with Ethereum Smart contracts, the major focus of the research, and some of the notable attacks 
that have been conducted are presented.  Smart Contract analysis tools are presented in Chapter 5 and 
the custom data selection and criteria for tools selection are formulated. Chapter 6 presents the results 
conducted using the tools and the dataset and discusses on the outcome of the results of the experiment. 
Finally, Chapter 7 ends the paper with conclusion. 
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2 Basics of blockchain  
 
 
This chapter will give the basics of blockchain technology which is needed to understand the Smart 
Contract vulnerabilities. Blockchain will be introduced and discussed with necessary core concepts for 
the fundamental understanding of the technology.  
 
Blockchain, in the most- simplest form, is a ledger that contains all the data in form of blocks which will 
be then appended to the ledger forming an immutable chain of blocks, where every block has a reference 
to earlier blocks, so that editing any block might turn the whole blockchain to be invalid and needed to 
be re-computed. In the following sub-chapters, a brief overview of blockchain is provided. To avoid the 
confusion, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum are one application of blockchain rather than 
the whole concept of blockchain. Blockchain is not cryptocurrency rather the base foundational 
technological concept, that cryptocurrencies use to make a decentralized ledger-based currency system 
[5]. More in depth information related to cryptocurrencies are provided briefly in this chapter of the 
research.  
 
Blockchain technologies also flirt with the idea of decentralization and distributed or peer to peer 
networks. Bitcoin has proven an example that a virtual digital currency, in colloquial terms 
cryptocurrency, can function without a need for a centralized authority. For that reason, blockchain 
provides a way for various parties involved in the network to validate data in blocks and maintain a 
network of trust that even if there are dishonest nodes and none of the network computers can be trusted, 
the blockchain can still be functional and immutable. Cryptographic applications in blockchain provide 
the opportunity to maintain the trust of the blockchain network even if the nodes are dishonest. Bitcoin, 
for example uses various concepts that can work as a payment protocol and even maintain anonymity 
of the transactions. Blockchains provide transparency and immutability, thus have many use cases 
including  governance, smart grids, logistics, FinTech solutions, banking and security [6]. In the 























The concept of blockchain has come around into existence, around the time of rise of the internet in 
1991 and the use cases of internet in every form human society from governance, banking, healthcare 
to content creation like media and social media. The core concept was developed from the idea of two 
researchers, who in their document proposed the following: “computationally practical procedures for 
digitally time-stamping documents so that it would be infeasible for a user either to back-date or 
forward-date the document”[7]. The technique was further developed to add multiple documents in form 
of blocks; hence the idea of block chain was formed. Chain meaning the individual blocks form a long 
chain each referencing to previous blocks forming an immutable chain. [8] 
 
Bitcoin became the revolutionary concept that shaded a spotlight on the blockchain when an anonymous 
person, with the pseudonym of “Satoshi Nakamoto” created the idea of a digital currency that would 
incorporate blockchain at its core [9]. He wrote the white paper and then started the early version of 
bitcoin development in 2009. The idea that Bitcoin tried to achieve was to create a peer-to-peer(P2P) 
decentralized digital currency and have a large pool of anonymous user validate transactions called as 
miners on a network that can have dishonest nodes by using cryptography and other algorithms. Bitcoin 
became a sensational technology and inspired wide range of possibilities on decentralization and 




Ethereum came up with even better idea on the decentralization, revolving around the use of smart 
contact, DAOs and Turing complete blockchain programming. Ethereum’s idea was created by Vitalik 
Buterin in 2013, which he wrote on White Paper and first released in 2015. Ethereum made development 
of many new concepts on Decentralized Financing (DeFi), and many cryptocurrencies (colloquial term 
for blockchain based digital currencies). Cryptocurrency trading started, and there are circa 1000 plus 
cryptocurrencies being traded with Fiat currency nowadays [2]. Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) was 
introduced as permissioned private blockchain solution under Linux Foundation and backed by 
IBM and other huge Tech Companies in December 2015. Hyperledger fabric provided 
industrial grade blockchain framework, that is programmable in most popular programming 
languages in the current Information Technology world.[10] 
 
2.1 Blockchain Architecture  
 
A decentralized blockchain in generally found in the following architecture: 
 
 
Figure 2- Blockchain Architecture [9] 
 
In the figure 2 above, various nodes called as miners in the Blockchain terminology try to validate a 
block of transaction with a consensus algorithm. The transaction to be validated are coded into the 
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consensus algorithm and mostly the miners must solve an extremely difficult, time and energy 
consuming hashing algorithm to validate a block. Once the correct hash is found then the block is 
considered as mined and appended to the public ledger. Different Blockchain offer different incentive 
model as reward for successfully mined block. This reward is the main source of motivation for 
individuals or companies to invest on expensive computers and hardware based hashing miners etc. The 
complexity of the mining algorithm is also used as a method of deterrence for trying to attack the 
blockchain or try to be dishonest because the gain received from investment of resources in mining 




2.2 Underlying cryptography concepts of blockchains 
 
This part focuses on the various implications of Security, including the challenges, problems, attack 
vectors, vulnerabilities, and mitigation. Blockchain heavily relies on Cryptography for maintaining 
security, anonymity, data integrity and uses of networking protocols for creating decentralized network. 
In the following chapters to come, the core cryptographic functions, consensus algorithm, decentralized 
networking will be mentioned. They are the building blocks of the secured blockchain, and which 
provides the core idea for Information security. Blockchain uses various complex cryptographic 
functions and consensus algorithms to maintain the system and services. These cryptographic functions 
are used for various purposes and can be categorized to the following manner: 
 
2.2.1 Hashed chain storage 
A cryptographic hash function is a non-reversible mathematical function, which means input will always 
give a fixed length output, but input cannot be reversed from output. Hash functions take arbitrary size 
of data in chunks and return a fixed length output in a deterministic pattern. Hashes are used in every 
field of computer science such as, Information Security and database storages to name a few. SHA256 
is one of the most used hashing algorithm in computer science. Most blockchains solutions use 
Cryptographic hash functions to get the hash value of the block to be appended to the Ledger and use 
hash pointer to provide reference to previous block, like linked-list data structure of hashes. Hashing is 
at the core of blockchain ledger [11]. 
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2.2.2 Merkle Tree 
An inversed binary tree structure of hashes that are generated from hashing the block and each hash 
pointing to the predecessor. Merkle Tree is generated by Double SHA (SHA256 hashing algorithm) 
hashing technique of blocks. The pseudo-code of Merkle tree hashing algorithm can be represented as: 
 
Merkle Root = SHA256.digest(SHA256.digest(BLOCK))  
 
The output of the algorithm results as Merkle root hash of a block and they are referenced in the next 





Figure 3--Merkle Tree of Leaves[10] 
 
 
Here each child nodes are hashed together until one Merkle root hash is found. The parent node's Merkle 
hash is always a concatenated hash of its child nodes. If the data is changed in one of the child nodes, 
the root hash will be rendered invalid. This technic ensures the integrity of the data. Merkle tree is the 
root concept used in Bitcoin and slightly modified version is used in Ethereum called as Patricia Merkle 
tree [12], but fundamentally it represents as inverted binary tree like structure where each block in the 





2.2.3 Digital Signatures 
 
Digital signature use public-key cryptography to generate keys, to ensure the validity of the signature 
and the data encryption/decryption. Public key cryptography works by producing a private key and 
public key pair, and the data signed by using a persons’ private key is always checked against the public 
key. The public key cryptography algorithm in basic is as follows: 
 
Encrypted Message = EncryptionFunction(Message, Public Key of recipient) 
Decrypted Message = DecryptionFunction(Encrypted Message, Private Key of reciever) 
 
Common Digital signature algorithm is RSA. RSA for example uses same function to encrypt and 
decrypt messages and the syntax is as follows: 
 
Message = EncryptDecryptFunction(Data, Public Key/Private Key) 
 
 
The data that has been issued using public key of the person can only be decrypted by the respective 
private key only. This will ensure that, in fact(mathematically), the issuer of the digital signature is the 
holder of the private key. Digital signatures are also used to create the wallet addresses for 
cryptocurrencies, thus the coins transferred to a persons’ public address is only accessible by their 
private key and when transferring the coin, only the holder of the private key can transfer the coins. 
Bitcoin and ETH use Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for digital signature [14]. 
 
2.2.4 Consensus algorithm 
 
Since blockchain is revolving around the idea of decentralization, consensus algorithm is used to 
maintain the trust in an environment where other nodes cannot be trusted and maintain the security, 
validation, and integrity of the data in the blocks. Bitcoin uses Proof of Work (PoW) and Ethereum uses 
Proof of Stake (PoS) as consensus algorithm. PoW uses computational resources as proof while PoS is 
based on the idea of staking certain Ether. Both, algorithms are designed to achieve trust in the 
decentralization network and reach common consensus between nodes about which blocks, and 
transactions are valid and what they should be based on.  The upcoming Chapter 3 will provide, 




3 Cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum)  
In this chapter, two of the most popular cryptocurrencies are introduced. Bitcoin and Ethereum are two 
widely popular blockchain based cryptocurrencies. This chapter will provide information for these two 
cryptocurrencies, and their fundamental differences and working principles. 
3.1 Bitcoin 
Bitcoin was introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto, a pseudonymous character, who developed the early 
version of Bitcoin. He is yet unknown to the world. Bitcoin became sensational technological concept 
since the start. 
 
The key problems that bitcoin was trying to solve is listed below: 
1. Solves double spending problem 
2. Decentralization of nodes 
3. Nodes enter and exit at will, accept the latest ledger 
4. Transactions are timestamped by timestamp server in chronological order 
5. Bitcoin is chain of digital signatures [11] 
 
Transaction is at the core of the blockchain, and each transaction are recorded into a block and signed 
with the private key of the sender and public key of the next owner. The core of the transaction as 
mentioned in Bitcoin Whitepaper, which describes, a cryptocurrency or a digital coin as chain of blocks 
of digitally signed transaction that are hashed using cryptographic hashing algorithms. The chain will 
be on a decentralized network, where the peers can join and leave at will and a copy public ledger will 
be maintained by each peer and the transactions can be verified with the digital signatures, through a 
process called mining. The process of mining refers to finding a computationally difficult cryptographic 
hash and once it is found the block is considered mined and for the miner of the transaction certain 










In the above figure 4, each block represents transaction that will be hashed using hashing algorithm, 
which is mentioned later in this document, to produce a unique hash. Each of these transactions are 
linked to previous transaction, thus the name blockchain. For a transaction to be valid all the previous 
transactions need to be valid, thus providing the integrity of the data. The aspect of security is achieved 
in such way that all peers maintain a public ledger which make any peer trying to modify the ledger 
corrupts the whole chain.  
 
Bitcoin uses Proof of Work (PoW) as consensus algorithm. It is based on Byzantine Fault Tolerance 
algorithm. PoW is based on finding a hash value for a block, through a process of mining and the 
complexity of the hash target value increases over time[14]. This time-consuming hashing and 
computationally expensive mechanism is used to make sure that the blocks are mined honestly and the 
incentive is paid for computational power used by the node. This concept is also used to control majority 
attack, since it requires huge computational resource to modify the ledger and the incentive for mining 
is bigger than using resources to control the ledger. However, PoW is computationally very expensive 
and requires expensive hardware setup as well as electricity costs for mining the blocks. Blocks are 
mined roughly every 10 minutes, difficulty increases over time and miners are paid in Bitcoins for 







Vitalik Buterin saw problems in Bitcoin, mostly energy efficiency and lack of Turing completeness in 
the transaction code, and decided to start Ethereum project to solve the computational cost by using 
Proof of Stake (PoS) algorithm which is computationally less expensive. Proof of Stake is discussed 
more in the consensus algorithm in chapter 2.2 [2]. Below are the Key Concepts from Ethereum that 
was unique and not available in Bitcoin:  
1. Smart contracts 
2. Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) 
3. Turing complete programming machine for blockchain. 
 
Ethereum tried to solve the existing problem in Bitcoin to introduce a fully programmable decentralized 
blockchain system. Ethereum to be energy efficient, uses Proof of Stake (POS) as the consensus 
algorithm for the network. The idea requires the user or the nodes to stake ETH(30 ETH to become a 
validator) [15] and they can work as a validator, which are essentially like miners for Ethereum Network. 
PoS tries to address the accessibility, centralization, and scalability of the system unlike PoW which 
aims for complete decentralization and also ensures less computational resource requirements. PoS also 
penalizes the validator in case they try to act maliciously, thus motivating the validating nodes for being 
good actor in the network. PoS also tries to prevent Majority attack, because the amount of Stake’s value 
needed is not worth to try to participate in such attacks [2][11]. 
 
 
3.3 Smart contracts with Ethereum 
Smart contract, in very basic form, is a contract that exist in form of code and the contract is enforced 
through programming. The idea of smart contract has existed since 1991 [7][8]. Ethereum took the 
concept of blockchain and added a Turing complete arbitrary piece of code, called smart contract, which 
once uploaded to the blockchain will always be on the blockchain, and the code are immutable and 
continue to exist on the chain for the lifetime of blockchain. Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) will 
execute transaction based on the smart contract and the smart contract code is written mostly in Solidity 
(JavaScript like) or Vyper (Python like). Major number of smart contracts are written in solidity, a high-





Since the development of smart contract on Blockchain, Ethereum has become the pioneer, as well as 
backbone for many cryptocurrencies and distributed apps (dApps). The idea of smart contracts has 
shown a new power of blockchain, unlike Bitcoin, which only stores value, Ethereum proved that there 
can be transactions as well as data that could reside on the blockchain and creating a global 
supercomputer  called EVM that can perform transactional and data computation [2]. This idea added a 
new development of arbitrary distributed application that can perform data computation and 
transactional changes autonomously. EVM can be thought as one singleton computer made of 
decentralized nodes  that can execute arbitrary codes that are Turing complete and can be added to the 
blockchain and perform transactions in an automated fashion without needing any interaction from 
centralized authority or humans. 
 
For this reason of immutability and fairly novel concept, smart contracts pose security threat. A buggy 
smart contract for reason of immutability and lifetime existence cannot be patched, which is a majority 
security hazard. If vulnerabilities are found, the smart contract code can be exploited to cause various 
kind of attacks, mostly leading to financial losses. The immutability of blockchain comes with a risk 
that, a smart contract even if there is bug or vulnerability, once uploaded to the network, can never be 
patched and reside the lifetime of blockchain. This issue leads to, and has led to, financial losses. Other 
blockchain network that has come up with smart contracts are EOS, Hyperledger Fabric, etc. Smart 
contracts have use cases in multiple areas like electronic voting, identity management, supply chain 
management, logistics, IoT, property management, banking and financial services, etc. [16][3] 
3.3.1 EVM 
EVM(Ethereum Virtual Machine), just like Java Virtual Machine, executes the bytecodes compiled 
from the Smart Contract code written in languages like Solidity, Vyper [3]. EVM is comprised of 140 
opcodes, uses 256-bit registers that can hold 1024 items. EVM limits the call stack to 1024 EVM words 
(256 bits word) on the virtual machine. The stack is assigned for call return addresses, and variable 
assignments. EVM while executing the transactions assigns and maintains a transient memory which is 
a EVM word-addressed byte array of 256bits up to the maximum call stack(1024 EVM words) until 
there will be stack overflow[12]. Every EVM execution costs GAS, which is a term used in Ethereum, 
which is paid by the caller of the contract or transaction. GAS is paid in Wei, which is the smallest 




Solidity is the de-facto language for writing smart contract. Solidity resembles JavaScript or C family 
language and is compiled to EVM compatible bytecode for execution. Below is the picture of solidity 
produced bytecode and instruction set for EVM from solidity code: 
 
 
Figure 5-Solidity Code[15] 
 
 
Figure 6- Solidity(solc files) compiled to EVM byte-code[15] 
 
In the figure 5, a contract that is written in Solidity is compiled to EVM bytecode shown in left of the 
figure 6. The first box of left hand is EVM byte code and two right hand boxes of figure 6 shows the 
instruction set that is executed by EVM. EVM is stack-based. Bytecodes contains the instruction set or 
OPCODES for EVM to perform the execution. EVM bytecodes are executed on stack based operations  
similar  to Java Virtual Machine(JVM). [17] points out that, a Low Level EVM bytecode has no notion 
of stack frames, no type checking, no abstractions for methods or classes in comparison to JVM. 
Furthermore, the research also suggests that EVM is purposed for doing simple computation for efficient 
storage of the Smart contracts  on the Blockchain of Ethereum.[17] 
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3.3.3 Smart Contract Code 
Given below in figure 7 is an example of smart contract code written in solidity. 
 
Figure 7-Smart contract written in Solidity [3] 
 
Line 1 of the contract defines the contract name “AWallet”. Line 5 is the constructor of the contract. 
According to [3] the constructor is only called once at the time of the contract creation. The “address” 
seen in the contact is the variable that holds the addresses. Addresses are 160 bits and used to uniquely 
identify each contract in the blockchain. The “outflow” seen in the line the line 10 is a hash table that 
keeps track of the all the address the contract sends money to. The “function pay” at line 7 is used for 
sending money by the owner of the contract. Also, all the Ether that are send to this contract address is 
held by this contract and the amount is recorded in the variable “balance” as seen in line 8.  Variable 
“balance” cannot be influenced by the programmer rather used to track the amount of Ether particular 
contracts hold at the time. At line 8 the function throws an exception with “throw” keyword if the sender 
is not the owner, or some ether is not transferred to the contract. At line 9 the call returns if the amount 
is greater than the balance the contract holds. Line 9 updates the hash table with the recipient’s address 
to the amount being transacted. At line 11 the “send” method can fail the recipient is a contract [3][17]. 
The smart contract written in Solidity are comprised of following declarations: 
a) Status Variable: These values get stored in the contract permanently 
b) Functions: The executable part of the contract 
c) Function Modifiers: Used to modify and add functionality to the contracts 
d) Events: A communication interface to EVM that can notify certain events have 
occurred, for debugging and alerts. 
e) Structures: custom data structures to group multiple data types together 




4 Security issues and vulnerabilities in blockchain  
In this chapter, vulnerabilities that exists in Blockchain technology will be presented. These 
vulnerabilities are generic vulnerabilities rather than smart contract specific. For understanding 
vulnerabilities of smart contracts, it is necessary to understand the vulnerability and security issues of 
the blockchain. 
 
Blockchain has implemented many techniques to curb the security vulnerabilities. A blockchain has few 
requirements to maintain the security and privacy of the system. In this chapter, a thorough analysis of 
Blockchain system attack vectors, Security requirements, Mitigation technic if present, future threats 
and most notable cyber-attacks will be given in a high level details. In the most fundamental level, a 
blockchain must provide following requirements to assert and secure the system: 
 
Consistency of the ledger: Since blockchain is based on transparent public ledger system for distributed 
network, it must provide the consistency of the ledger across all the nodes. 
 
Integrity and Immutability of the data: Blockchain might be running financial or other highly 
valuable data, so ensuring the integrity of data and immutability of the chain must be considered. 
 
Availability of the service and data: The network must maintain the availability of service, since it is 
a decentralized service, the availability of the network as well as the data should be considered. If 
financial transactions are to be made, the network must maintain the uptime availability and processing 
of the transaction. 
 
Confidentiality and anonymity: Blockchain solutions must provide confidentiality of the users, since 
the network and ledger are peer to peer. Some solutions focus on anonymity or pseudo-anonymity. 
Bitcoin ensures this by only providing a cryptographic hash of the public key of the user thus 
maintaining the anonymity while the trust was maintained by usage of cryptography. 
 
 
4.1 Major attack vector on the Blockchain  
Various Attack vectors exist in Blockchain. Some of them are directly related to other attack vectors 
that are common in any networked application. There are distinct attack vectors that only relates to 
blockchain. In the following sections, all the major attack vectors are presented: 
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4.1.1 Consensus attack (51% Majority attack): 
 
This attack vector is one of the most common attack in the blockchain or distributed networked systems. 
As the name suggest, this kind of attacks happen, when a malicious party tries to own more than 51% 
of the computing resources of the network and thus trying to influence the ledger or then hijack the 
consensus on their favor. For this reason, incentive models in form of BTC or ETH is provided to make 
sure that the motivation for reward is so high that a user would not rather try to spend resources on trying 
to own an influence on the network. Here is an excerpt from Bitcoin Whitepaper: “The system is secure 
as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker 
nodes.” [8] The attacker who is attacking with this sort of vector, can double spend coins as well as stop 
confirmation of transactions but are not able to mine new coins or reverse confirmed transaction or false 
creation of transactions.  In August 2016, Two Ethereum based blockchain solutions, Krypton and shift 
suffered such attack. Another great example of the 51% attack was against Bitcoin Gold in May 2018, 
a fork of Bitcoin, where malicious actors controlled the majority of network and performed double 
spending attack for several days stealing $18 million worth of Bitcoin Gold. [9][18] 
 
4.1.2 Fork Problems 
 
Fork in blockchain happens when two different chains of different blocks are formed while mining the 
blocks. This can happen intentionally or then deliberately orchestrated. To mitigate the forking issues, 
the consensus algorithm is designed to accept the longest valid chain, which means that the longest of 
the chain with valid blocks will be considered as valid and added to the ledger.  
 




A forking problem, such as shown in the diagram above in figure 8, where the consensus is not achieved 
within the participating nodes, where one group of participants will accept one of the ledgers as updated 
version while the other group will fork a new transactional ledger both pointing to block 3 as the parent 
node in the above picture. This leads to existence to two ledgers independent of each other that has 
branched out from Block 3. Some example of fork that happened are Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash, Ethereum 
and Ethereum Classic.[18] 
4.1.3 Double spending attack 
A double spending attack happens when a user tries to pay two entities with the same amount and hoping 
that both transactions will get succeeded and added to the chain. This problem can also exist if two 
blocks are mined at the same time. Most of the double spending attacks are possible if an entity owns 
51% or more of the networks computational power and thus validating both transactions and appending 
in the ledger[20]. [9] mentioned in the white paper about the mitigation of double spending attack by 
providing a computationally heavy Proof of Work (PoW) algorithm which will validate the transaction 
against a public ledger that will be shared among of all of the participants in the node and only the first 
transaction is accepted as valid. One great example of double spending attack was done on Ethereum 
Classic in August 2020, a majority attack and $5.8 Million double spent.[21] 
 
4.1.4 Network attacks 
A decentralized system like blockchain is very vulnerable to network attack. Some of the network attack 
vectors are briefly discussed below: 
DNS attack: A DNS is used as a mechanism to discover active peers in the network. When a 
node joins the network, it queries DNS and it gets a list of records of the IP addresses of the 
peers. A DNS, according to bitcoin developer guide opens wide array of attack possibilities. 
These attacks can range from, man in the middle attacks, stale records, cache poisoning etc.[18] 
BGP hijack and spatial partitioning: Blockchain are made up of two types of nodes. Full nodes, who 
are the actual participant of the network, and they maintain the blockchain, validation and updates. 
Whereas lightweight nodes are not involved in maintaining the blockchain and they rely on full nodes 
to join the network. If these nodes are spatially located on the same Autonomous Systems owned by 
ISPs, a BGP hijacking attack is possible. [22] noticed that by hijacking fewer than 100 Border Gateway 
Protocol (BGP) prefixes in Bitcoin, an attacker can isolate up to 50% of the network’s hash rate.  
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BGP hijack example case: A malicious ISP announced BGP prefixes belonging to major ISPs 
including Amazon, OVH, Digital Ocean, etc. and since the Bitcoin Network data is plaintext, the 
attacker was able to intercept the traffic routed to mining pools and was able to make 83,000 USD. 
Another case includes, BGP attacks launched against MyEtherWallet.com in April 2018, and the 
attacker were able to make 152,000 USD.[23]  
Eclipse Attack: In this kind of attack, an attacker or malicious nodes can take over the Node 
cluster and isolate the honest nodes and feed them with the fake information and thus turning 
them into dishonest node as well. The solution to this is that the honest node needs to be 
connected to at least one honest node, but if majority of the nodes in the cluster are malicious 
then compromising of honest nodes might occur. [24]  
DdOS Attack: Blockchain being networked application, is prone to DDOS attacks. DdOS 
attack in case of Blockchain like Bitcoin and Ethereum can happen if 51% network is owned 
by certain entity or entities. Such cases of DdOS attack has happened to Bitfinex [25]. Mempool 
flooding is another form of DdOS attack that has happened to bitcoin. 
Case Studies: “On November 11, 2017, the Bitcoin mempool size exceeded 115k unconfirmed 
transactions, resulting in $700 million USD worth of transaction stall. In June 2018, again the mempool 
was attacked with 4,500 unconfirmed spam transactions which increased the mempool size by 45MB. 
The increased size led to a spike in the mining fee and legitimate users were propelled to pay higher fee 
to get their transactions mined ”[26] 
Cryptojacking:  
It is a form of attack that was conducted by attackers by using victim’s browser to participate 
in PoW, or mining, without their consent or notice. UK’s National Cyber Security Centre 
(NCSC),  on its yearly cyber security report, declared cryptojacking as a “significant threat 
”.[22],[23],[27] 
4.2 How these affect cryptocurrencies built on blockchains  
There has been many notable security attacks and incidents on blockchain, below is a table that lists the 
most notable attacks that has led to huge financial losses: 
 
Incident Type of attack Loss 











MT GOX(2nd) Cryptocurrency theft: 
Exploitation of transaction 
malleability as the cause 
$450,000,000 
 
Ethereum(1st),2016 TheDAO attack happened because of 
the bug un the code  
$70,000,000 
Ethereum(2nd) 2017 Multi-sig DAPP vulnerability $30,000,000 
Ethereum(3rd)2017 Another wallet bug  $275,000,000 of frozen Ether which 
forced a software update 
MyEtherWallet DNS hijacking attack $152,000  
Bithumb, 2018 Phishing email sent to the users to 
redirect to malicious URL 
$30,000,000 
 
Table 1-Notable Cyber Attacks and lossess. 
 
 
Cryptocurrency world has suffered huge losses from cyber-attack. The main motive in this kind of cyber-
attack are mostly financial and design flaws of the blockchain.  
4.3 Security issues with smart contracts based on existing taxonomies  
Literature [3] has done a great work to analyze vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart contract and has 
provided a taxonomy based on the findings. A lot of vulnerabilities arise from the Solidity compiled 
bytecode. Even though contracts written on solidity looks like functions, EVM does not support 
functions and solidity functions are compiled  as a unique signature [3]. If the signature matches a 
function on a contract, then it jumps to that part of code otherwise it will jump to fallback function. A 
fallback function is anonymous function taking no arguments and can be arbitrarily programmed.  The 




Table 2-Taxonomy by [2] 
The taxonomy shown in Table 2 classifies vulnerabilities found in Ethereum Smart contracts to three 
levels. The classification suggests that different vulnerabilities in Ethereum Smart Contact are from 
Programming Language Solidity or from flaws in EVM and some vulnerabilities directly relatable to 
the Blockchain. Each of the vulnerabilities from the taxonomy are explained in the following part. 
4.3.1  Vulnerabilities in Solidity 
 
The following vulnerabilities happen because of the flaws of the de-facto programming language 
solidity. Being a new language and similarities to C family languages, a developer might fall into 
some quirks that are not noticeable and can lead to attacks and one great example of the attack is The 
DAO hack. The vulnerabilities directly relating to solidity are explained below: 
 
Call to unknown: When a function which doesn’t exist in contract is called, it will lead to a fallback 
function, which is a special function that can be arbitrarily programmed, doesn’t have names and 
arguments. This quirk can lead to arbitrary code execution by attacker.[3] 
 
Gasless Send: Because Ethereum has a maximum gas limits and gas limit exception occurs when there 
is gas exhaustion. Gas is consumed with every execution of code and a contract can run into gas 
exhaustion. This behavior can be sometimes exploited to alter the state of contract by having inexpensive 
fallback function in case of exception and send Ether without paying gas. [3] 
 
Exception Disorders: Some of the low-level code doesn’t throw exception rather false or true, which 
if the developer hasn’t well considered might make the contract vulnerable. Solidity has situations where 
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an exception like call-stack reached limit or gas is exhausted or throw command is executed. The way 
Solidity handles execution leads to vulnerability  as exceptions are not predictable and sometimes 
handled  just as true or false.[3] 
 
Type casts: Solidity typecasting can lead programmers to false belief that it is error prone and might 
lead to unexpected vulnerabilities in the run-time. Solidity compiler does not perform error checks, 
except for few cases like assigning integer value to string as an example. Also at the runtime exception 
are not thrown in case of type errors and can lead to vulnerable behaviors.[3] 
 
 
Reentrancy: This is the most well-known vulnerability that caused the DAO hack where $50 Million 
was stolen from a Contract named DAO [28]. Reentrancy happens when an attacker calls the vulnerable 
function multiple times, without the previous call being completed.  In EVM the caller of the contract 
can perform message-calls to another contract, which can be performed by calling a function in another 
contract or sending Ether [3], [17]. Literature [17] mentions that the caller of the contract can perform 
arbitrary execution, even a call to other contract before returning the control to the caller function. If a 
contract is not reentrancy safe, the attacker can perform this sort of attack. [3] mentions that even when 
a non-recursive function is called, the attacker can re-enter the calling function multiple times because 
of the fallback mechanism of the EVM code. An example code from [17] shows the reentrancy which 




Figure 9- Reentrancy Vulnerable code [15] 
In figure 9, the contract has a reentrancy bug that allows the caller to call the line 3 code multiple times 
since the account is assigned value of 0 in line 4. The simple solution to this is just to move line 4 to line 





Figure 10-Reentrancy code bug fix [15] 
 
Ethereum has no way as [3], [17]suggests to solve reentrancy. The only way is to beware of this quirk 
of Solidity and test the code before deployment that it is reentrancy safe. 
 
Keeping Secrets: Contract fields can be public or private. Private field being private doesn’t guarantee 
secrecy in Solidity code. Since the code are stored in the blockchain, which is a public ledger. There is 




4.3.2 Vulnerabilities in EVM 
 
There are other vulnerabilities that comes from the EVM. These vulnerabilities from the taxonomy are 
briefly discussed in the following part: 
 
Immutable bugs: The smart contract by nature, once uploaded to the blockchain is immutable and will 
exists for the lifetime of blockchain. If there are any bugs in the contract, they can’t be patched. This is 
a major security hazard and also the main reason that every contract that is deployed must be ensured 
that they are non-vulnerable. Once deployed to the chain, they cannot be patched and will remain 
vulnerable, and programmers have to just anticipate that this issue will be fixed. Many buggy contracts 
have been exploited  but [3] explains that for TheDAO hack, the countermeasure was taken has a hard-
fork rolling back to the previous commit and recovering the funds. This was against, for some of the 
Ethereum community, against the idea of “code is law” principle of blockchain and Ethereum Classic 
was formed as the disagreement. [28]  
 
 
Ether lost in transfer: Ethereum addresses are of 160-bit sequence. If Ether is transferred to orphan 
address, that are not associated with any wallet or contract, then the transferred Ethereum will get lost. 
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Orphan addresses in this context means that the address is valid but does not belong to any user or any 
contract. Lost ethers cannot be recovered. A mistake in the address while sending ether can also go to 
wrong account and never be recovered. An user involving in the transactions needs to manually be sure 
of the address of the contract or  the address of the recipient is valid.[3] 
 
Stack size limit: The stack of EVM has size of 1024 frames, which was vulnerable to exception disorder 
and stack size limit vulnerabilities. Each time a code is executed the stack grows by 1. When it reaches 
the max size of 1024 there will be stack overflow throwing an exception. [3] mentions that until October 
2016 an adversary could create almost full stack call to the victim’s contract and an exception is thrown. 
If the victim’s contract has not handled the exception well the attack would be successful. But the hard 
fork of Ethereum has addressed this issue.[2] 
4.4 Vulnerabilities in Blockchain 
Some vulnerabilities in the taxonomy are related to the blockchain itself. A brief discussion of the 
vulnerabilities is provided in the following: 
 
Generating randomness: 
Because of EVM’s bytecodes Deterministic and thus true randomness is hard to achieve. To gain 
randomness, some contract creators use pseudo-random number generator which is based on the 
timestamp of the block that will happen in the future, as future blocks are not predictable. Miners are 
still under control of what goes to the blockchain, and they can see what pseudo-random numbers are 
used. A malicious miner can try to craft a block that could bias pseudo-random generations.[3] 
Unpredictable state: 
The contract’s state changes with transaction, so it is hard to predict the state of contract when the 
transaction is being executed. There is no preservation of order in the transactions, a transaction send 
first still could be added to block later. Moreover, miners have choice over transaction ordering to add 
to the block. Another unpredictable state happens when there is a fork in the block and until the 
consensus is achieved which fork will be appended to the chain.[3] 
Time constraints: 
Time constraints are implemented as block-stamps, and they are agreed by all miners. Timestamp are 
shared by all the contract in a block and they can be exploited by malicious miners by choosing a suitable 
















After the work [3] more vulnerabilities have emerged and DASP 10 suggests ten vulnerabilities found 
in Ethereum smart contracts. The DASP 10 vulnerabilities are show below: 
 
No Vulnerability Vulnerability mentioned by Atzei et al. 
1 Access Control - 
2 Arithmetic  - 
3 Bad Randomness Generating Randomness 
4 Denial of service - 
5 Front running Unpredictable State 
6 Reentrancy Call to unknown 
Reentrancy 
7 Short addresses - 
8 Time manipulation Time Constraints 
9 Unchecked low level calls Gasless Send 
Exception Disorders 
10 Other - 
Table 3-DASP 10 Vulnerabilites mapping to Atzei Et al. [26] 
 
Notable Attacks  
Below are listed the example of well-known attack that happened to Ethereum smart contract [29]. 
• DAO hack: Because of reentrancy vulnerabilities, attacker drained 3.6 million ether 
into another contract [30] 
• Parity Multisig Wallet hack: 
Vulnerability found in the contract of Parity Multisig led to stealing of  150,00= 
ETH [31]  
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5 Smart Contract analysis  
In this chapter, necessary groundwork needed for the smart contract analysis are presented. Research 
questions, criteria for tools and smart contract for testing selection are discussed. They are the basis of 
the results which will be shown in chapter 6. 
 
Investigation from earlier articles suggests that  there are multiple variety of tools that are widely used 
in detection of smart contract vulnerabilities. In this section of the thesis, a list of ten popular tools is 
chosen to be tested. There was a perfect tool called SmartBugs [32] which was well suited for the 
experiment and research on the Vulnerable Ethereum smart contracts and analysis tools from the 
vulnerability taxonomies provided in earlier section. The main motivation of the research is to 
understand the tools used in Smart contract vulnerability detection, what are their strengths and how do 
they compare to each other in terms of vulnerability finding and time performance. Analysis of smart 
contract vulnerabilities are done with the help of Smartbugs which helps to gather all popular tools in 
one place. Smartbugs was well suited tool for this part of the research which saved time to rewrite a new 
tool and reinventing the wheel.   
 
Research Questions: 
1. What kind of vulnerabilities exist in Ethereum Smart contracts? 
2. What Kind of tools exist to detect vulnerabilities? 
3. How those vulnerabilities can be mapped to vulnerability taxonomies? 
4. How can the tools be compared to each other in various terms? 
5.1 Custom dataset selection 
 
A set of 32 different smart contracts written in Solidity from various categories were chosen for the 
analysis. These data represent ten of the vulnerabilities from DASP10. The following table shows the 
category of the vulnerable contract and number of contracts chosen for the research. 
 
All the contracts shown in Table 4 are selected from each of the vulnerabilities that are classified in 
DASP10 vulnerability index. The reason for this selection is to find what tools cover which of the 
vulnerabilities, so that an idea of use cases of tool can be derived. Furthermore, the coverage from all 






No Category Contracts Selected  
1 Access Control 2 
2 Arithmetic  5 
3 Bad Randomness 2 
4 Denial of service 3 
5 Front running 2 
6 Reentrancy 8 
7 Short addresses 1 
8 Time manipulation 3 
9 Unchecked low level calls 3 
10 Other 3 
 Total: 32 
 
Table 4-Selected contracts for research 
 
5.2 Criteria for tools selection 
The tools that were selected for the experiment and their availability is given in table 5. The tools 
selected for the research as shown in Table 5 are widely used symbolic execution, static analysis tool, 
except for Solhint which is a utility for linting solidity code. While other tools are also available, the 
tools given in the Table 5 are commonly used tools and recommended by various Ethereum Smart 
Contract security enthusiasts and developers. These tools are also already supported by SmartBugs, 
which was another reason for the selection. The criteria of selection were, a) easy integration with 
SmartBugs and b) favorability by security enthusiasts in Ethereum Development community. With the 
selected tools and the contracts, SmartBugs was used to execute the analysis and the results produced 







No. Name of the tool What does it do? 
 
Availability 
1 HoneyBadger  Find Honey Pot in 
Ethereum contract 
https://github.com/christoftorres/HoneyBadger 




3 Manticore Symbolic execution of 
EVM binaries and 
smart contracts 
https://github.com/trailofbits/manticore/ 
4  Mythril  Smart contact 
disassembler  and 
analysis 
https://github.com/ConsenSys/mythril-classic 
5 Osiris Symbolic execution 
based on Oyente 
https://github.com/christoftorres/Osiris  
6 Oyente Symbolic execution https://github.com/melonproject/oyente 
 
7  Securify 
 
Static analysis https://github.com/eth-sri/securify 
8 Slither 
 
Static analysis https://github.com/crytic/slither 
9 SmartCheck  Static analyis https://github.com/smartdec/smartcheck 
10 Solhint  Linting utility for 
Solidity 
https://github.com/protofire/solhint 




6 Presentation of the results 
In this chapter, the result from the smart contact analysis done with the help of SmartBugs on custom 
datasets against widely used tools are presented. The finding from the experiment of the analysis is 
discussed. 
 
The research was conducted with the help of SmartBugs with modification for the need of the research. 
A set of 32 vulnerable smart contract was chosen for the research. Each of the contract were selected 
from various categories of Vulnerabilities to meet the needs of the experiment. The data sets have been 




SmartBugs is an automation tool, that provides a common place for running varieties of symbolic 
execution and static analysis tools available for Ethereum Vulnerabilities. It is an automated tools 
runner, which does not do the analysis itself, rather bundles the available tools and runs test on the 
contracts supplied and produces the result output as a JSON or Sarif file. The outputted result files need 
to be analyzed separately. It can be used to collect data on smart contract vulnerabilities. SmartBugs is 
written in Python3. SmartBugs is extensible. The tools needed to be used and supported by the 
framework can be added. SmartBugs uses Docker Images of tools that are supported and runs them in a 
sequential manner against the provided contracts. SmartBugs is easy to use and can perform bulk 
analysis of contracts. Also, the authors have provided already large set of datasets covering many 
different Ethereum Vulnerabilities. SmartBugs also already comes with a huge list of widely used tools 
like, Mythril, Maian and Slither to name a few popular ones [32].  
 
On the source code of SmartBugs, time log was added to measure the time taken by each tool for 
analyzing the contracts. The code added is appended to the Appendix 1. The following figure shows the 
time taken to perform an analysis by all the tools in the updated SmartBugs software and output window 






6.1.2 Outcome Of the Test 
  
Figure 11-Output of Average from the analysis 
 
In the above figure 11 of SmartBugs output in terminal, the average time consumptions and total 
calculations part was added to the original code and the source can be found later in the appendix. Other 
lines are the output of SmartBugs itself, which show the file being analyzed, the tool used for analysis 
and time take for each execution of the tool. The following figure 12 shows the time taken to perform 
analysis by all the tools in the updated SmartBugs software. Below is a bar chart of the average time 












Figure 12-Bar chart of average time taken by tools 
 
From the above figure, SmartCheck, Maian and Manticore took the longest time to analyze the contract. 
The reasons for this will be clarified in the section where each tool will be mapped to vulnerabilities. 
The data produced from the SmartBugs was in Json Format and Sarif format. For simplicity, json data 
was used. Python and manual analysis were used to analyze the data and produce the output. The plot 
graph was also drawn using python Matplotlib library. The analysis of the data was manual process. 
And python was used later to work on the data and produce the result. The comparison matrix from the 
outcome is shown in the following matrix: 
 
 











0 0 0 1 11 
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dos_address 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 2 2 0 
dos_number 0 0 0 4 0 0 5 4 1 0 
dos_simple 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 






0 0 0 0 4 
4 
4 1 
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Table 6-Total number of vulnerability results produced by various tools against the dataset 
 
Color Code Yellow: Data considered as anomaly 
 
The above-mentioned experiment was done on the data produced by SmartBugs which were in json 
format. There was lot of manual analysis of the data. A separate test was made to look at the output of 
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the data directly by analysis tools by slight modification on the code of SmartBugs. The original code 
of Smartbugs did not have such an output. SmartBugs tool was modified to look at the terminal logs 
from the tools directly before it parses to the parser for data collection. This process gave more clarity 
on each tool than the data that was produced from SmartBugs which needed data analyzing and nested 
json parsing in some case. The contract selected for this purpose was SimpleDao, as reentrancy is one 
of the biggest vulnerabilities of Ethereum smart contract.  
 




Figure 13-SimpleDAO contract code 
 
The contract in Figure 13 has Reentrancy vulnerability. The contract was taken from sample contracts 
provided in Smartbugs. The contract has Reentrancy vulnerability on the yellow marker where the 
amount is deducted after calling the function. This is the major cause of Reentrancy as the fallback may 
be exploited by attacker many times emptying the contract. This is the famous TheDAO hack. The 
contract above has been run and analyzed tool- by-tool basis. A discussion on the tool and their 
performance are provided. A terminal screenshot is also added as they give more clear idea on the state-






Figure 14-Conkas Output 
 
Conkas has found Reentrancy, Integer Overflow, Unchecked Low Level calls. Verbosity is good and 









While Mythril found out Integer Overflow, Reentrancy and Unchecked low level calls, the verbosity of 
the output is not human-readable rather json programmable. This will have an added overhead to smart 
contract developers to try to parse the JSON. The messages are meaningful despite being hard to analyze 





Figure 16-Osiris Output 
 
Osiris Detected Arithmetic Bugs, Callstack Bug and Reentrancy bug in the contract. Callstack bug is 
something new that was not previously in Conkas or Mythril. Also, the output looks very readable. The 
verbosity looks very good. The true false representation makes it easier for anyone to follow and what 
to expect for. However, there was noticeable time difference from what Osiris reported and what was 
recorded via the code that was added to SmartBugs. This also suggests that there is extra overhead of 










Figure 17-Slither Output 
 
Slither has extra information that are very helpful in form of warning. Low Level Calls and Reentrancy 
were detected, and the color coding makes things more informational. The verbosity is good, while 








Figure 18-Oyente Output 
 
Oyente has similar clarity to Osiris, messages shown as true/false. Oyente was able to detect Reentrancy, 







Figure 19-Solhint Output 
Solhint is a linting tool for Solidity, and as the result shows that it has been complaining about the 
indentation. As a linting tool it can help for consistency of writing code, but Solhint does not seem to be 









There was no particular output to terminal from smartcheck but the time consumption is surprisingly 
too long than average. It is not verbose at all, time consuming and later in the discussion it will be 





Figure 21-Honeybadger Output 
 
Honeybadger specializes in finding honeypots in smart contracts. Honeypots in smart contract are 
designed to scam victims by making a contract code look vulnerable and making the attacker believe 
that if they send some ether first the contract can be exploited. It can be a good tool for detecting 










Figure 22-Manticore output 
 
Figure 23-Manticore Time consumption 
 
 
The output of manticore was too big but the warnings was repeated and only a small portion of the 
screenshot has been taken. Manticore was also able to detect External Calls and reentrancy vulnerability. 

















Figure 25-Maian Time consumption 
 
Maian specializes in finding suicidal, prodigal and lock vulnerable contracts. It did not detect any of 






Figure 26-Securify time consumption 
Securify did not produce any output on this experiment run. Just as a quick testing tool, Securify would 
not qualify. However, looking at the Json Result from Smartbug, there was no mentioning of Reentrancy 
or other bugs.  
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After going through the output and analyzing them on tool-by-tool basis. Four tools, Slither, Conkas, 
Osiris and Mythril were found out to be able to detect popular DASP10 vulnerabilities. They were 
chosen to be compared with the values from the Table 6 to a graph to find the results visually. The color-
coded part from table 6 was removed from the cell’s value on Slither tool because of assumed anomaly 
in the data. The result can be seen in the following: 
 
 
Figure 27-Results found by selected tools on each contract 
 
6.2 Discussion of the results 
Table 6 provides the data mapped to each contract used in the test datasets to the tools. Below will be 
discussion on the results of the tools based on the matrix and separate test-runs and the reasons for 
varying number of results to the different contracts. 
 
Osiris was able to detect Reentrancy, overflow bugs, callstack bugs in the dataset. Osiris could not detect 
DOS address bugs, on ERC20 contract. However, in the Governmental Survey Contract, Osiris was able 
to detect, overflow bugs and time -dependency bugs. From the analysis of data, Osiris can be used to 
figure out Reentrancy, Callstack, Time Dependency and Overflow Bugs. The average time taken for 
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SolHint has highest number of findings in the results. The reason for this is SolHint is a linter tool that 
checks for linting errors in the source code of the Solidity contracts. SolHint cannot be considered a true 
Symbolic Execution tool but helps Smart Contract developers to have a consistent formatting of their 
code and can be considered as a visualization Tool. Also, the average time taken by Solhint is also 
considerably low. 
 
Honeybadger, on the other hand specializes in finding honey pots in the Ethereum contracts. In the test 
dataset, Honebadger was able to detect on three contracts: open address lottery, crypto lottery, odd and 
evens contracts hinting signs of honeypot. Honeypots in smart contract, which is created to look like a 
vulnerable contract, so the user can drain the contract if they send certain ether amount of contract first. 
It can be a great deal for scanning contracts that are designed by malicious developers with an intention 
to scam others. Honeybadger is relatively less time consuming. 
 
Conkas, was able to detect different types of vulnerabilities in the contracts. Conkas was able to detect, 
Time Manipulations, Unchecked Low-Level Calls, Transaction Ordering Dependence, and Integer 
Overflow. Conkas for example in governmental survey contract, despite showing 12 vulnerabilities, 
they were repetition of the vulnerability it was detected mentioned earlier but on different line numbers. 
Conkas also suggests the line number in the contract where the vulnerabilities occur in the contract. 
 
Maian is able to detect lock, prodigal and suicidal vulnerable contracts. In, Lotto contract Maian detected 
prodigal vulnerable while in Parity wallet 2 contract both suicidal and prodigal was true. No lock 
vulnerable contract was detected in the dataset. Maian also took relatively long time in comparison to 
other tools and the reason could be the algorithm to detect these vulnerabilities Maian can detect are 
computationally time consuming. Time performance did not feel satisfactory for the number of results 
produced. 
 
Manticore, from the data matrix shows highest count of vulnerability (ten) in reentrance contract, but 
most of them are repeating in multiple lines, some of them as a suggestion of potential bugs or then 
warning. Manticore was good to detect reentrancy bug, gave suggestions about uninitialized storage, 
warning over Timestamp instructions, Invalid instructions, External calls to sender on mishandled 
contract. Manticore also showed line numbers and the code that the issue raised from. Manticore was 
also relatively time consuming too, but was good to suggest potential bugs, give warnings etc. 
 
Smartcheck listed the data in different way compared to other tools. While Smartcheck was able to 
detect and show different problems on different line of the code and content, the result name was mostly 
non-verbose but rather presented as, Solidity Visibility or Solidity upgrade to 50, Solidity Revert 
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Require etc. Smartcheck’s error name were not self-explanatory compared to other tools. Smartcheck 
also took the longest time in average compared to all other tools.  
 
Mythril detected highest on Parity wallet 2 contract. The vulnerabilities that were found were Integer 
Overflow, exceptional state, Integer underflow in the Parity Wallet contract. Mythril was also able to 
detect call to external contract, Unchecked call return value and Transaction order dependence. The data 
showed line number, type of the issue and description. Mythril had highly verbose output and relatively 
low execution average time. 
 
Securify was able to detect mostly from the categories of reentrancy and missing input validation. 
Securify did not have results on most of the contracts. On reentrany contract it had found the reentrancy 
vulnerabilities. Something new that was seen in securify compared to other contract was missing input 
validation on SimpleDao contract. Securify had one of the highest time consumptions on average. 
 
Slither, had a highly verbose output, it also labelled the impact and confidence of the vulnerabilities, 
mapping to the line numbers etc. Slither was able to detect vulnerabilities of Re-entrancy, unchecked 
low level calls, time dependence and the labelling and overall performance and vulnerability coverage 
was great. The average time taken was relatively low. 
 
Based on the above result of vulnerability mapping matrix, Silther, Mythril and conkas were able to 
cover maximum vulnerable contracts. There were some tools that took exceptionally long compared to 
other tools for example Smartcheck. The reason for time long time consumption could not be 
understood. Solhint specialized in other use cases like checking the contract syntax for solidity and 
Honebadger specialized in suicidal contracts.  
 
Ethereum smart contract because of their relatively new style of programming and some design flaws 
of solidity, many vulnerabilities have been identified. Some of these vulnerabilities has led to financial 
losses, for example DAO hack, Parity wallet hack etc. Major vulnerabilities include Reentrancy, Call to 
unknown, suicidal contracts etc. Some of these contracts still might exist in the Blockchain, as once the 
vulnerable contract once deployed to blockchain will prevail forever for the lifetime of Ethereum 
Blockchain. Hopefully, someday these issues will be mitigated by some clever people designing and 
developing the blockchain code. 
  
The existing vulnerabilities resulting from some security breaches and hacks are classified in DASP10 
vulnerability lists, which will continue to evolve as more vulnerabilities will be found. Earlier researches 
such as [3] had come up with a vulnerability taxonomies and while other researches point to DASP 10 
as the latest vulnerability classification. The result from the tools and their analysis through a common 
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tool SmartBugs is useful for smart contract developers to analyze their contracts, before the contract 
will be uploaded to the Blockchain where the vulnerable contract will exist forever.  On top of that, tools 
like Smartbugs have removed the trouble for developers to worry about downloading many tools and 
run their code to scan for vulnerabilities. The result suggests that each tools have their own peculiarity 
and needs to be used to cover as many vulnerabilities as possible in the smart contract and to keep the 
financial aspect of the smart contracts on Blockchain secured.  
 
Apart from the tools that exist to detect vulnerabilities can also be used by malicious attackers to scan 
vulnerable smart contract, which will continue to exist on the Ethereum Blockchain. This can bring, and 
has brought, financial losses to the people who have invested in the Blockchain. This stays a major issue 
for Ethereum blockchain, as this is a double-edged sword to the security that Blockchain provides on 
the integrity of the data and public ledger, while leaving the vulnerable contracts to exist forever. 
Probably, someday there will be found some smart solution to tackle these issues and hopefully these 
tools will help to bring safe secure Smart contracts in the future. From the test following conclusion was 





Tool Usefulness as a quick vulnerability checking 
tool 
Verbosity Time  
Conkas Can detect some vulnerability from DASP 10 
like Reentrancy, LL calls, Integer Overflow. 













Osiris Able to detect popular DASP vulnerabilities 
and usable as a quick command line tool 
Very verbose 
output and 
easy to grasp 
Low 
Slither Detects popular DASP 10 and useful as a 






helful   
Low 
Oyente Detects popular DASP 10 vulnerabilities and 







Solhint Useful as a linter but not to detect 
vulnerabilities 
Ok Low 
Smartcheck No output on the test run No output in 
the test run 
Exceptionally high 
Honeybadger Good tool for detecting honeypots Verbose and 




Manticore Detects popular DASP 10 vulnerabilities. 
Useful as a quick command line tool too 
Verbose but 
complicated 
to read and 
huge output 
High 
Maian  Good tool for detecting suicidal, prodigal and 
lock vulnerable contracts 
Verbose High 
Securify No output on test run No output on 
test run  
Low 





Blockchain has been pondered by many institutions as a revolutionary technology that will bring 
potential benefits to industries, governance, and financial institutions. The concept of blockchain 
provides a possibility of decentralized or governed model of doing transactions of many sorts. Bitcoin 
initially created the hype because of massive surges in price and making early bearers and investors a 
huge gain. Ethereum, as they claim, came up with a new revolutionary concept of Turing Complete 
programmable blockchain giving birth to plethora of cryptocurrencies. HLF joined the league as an 
industrial blockchain. Many other blockchain technologies and concepts have been born now. 
Blockchain primarily using cryptography and other algorithms of computer science provides integrity 
and confidentiality of data where none of the peers in the network or decentralized system can be trusted. 
However, any system is vulnerable, and thus is blockchain.  
 
In this research, an overview related to blockchain including the history, uses of cryptography, 
consensus algorithm was thoroughly researched based on other literature and articles, thus providing a 
ground up information. Security vulnerability in blockchain as-a-whole was presented. Empirically, the 
major focus of research was Ethereum Smart contract and the vulnerabilities that has led to massive 
financial losses and tools available for analyzing vulnerabilities. In the research, an introduction to smart 
contract, vulnerabilities classified by research literatures was reviewed and analyzed. Also, tools 
available to detect the vulnerabilities was studied and presented. An empirical study of ten popular 
vulnerability detection tools were studied with the help of automation tool called SmartBugs. The study 
found out that SmartBugs is well suited tool for developers for choosing many tools in one place and do 
an automated test to find vulnerabilities in Smart contracts. However, these tools cannot prevent 
vulnerable contract that are already deployed. The tools were compared against time consumption and 
the amount of detection they can do on a curated test data set of DASP10 vulnerabilities.  
 
The conclusion from the research is that tools like SmartBugs and other symbolic execution tools will 
help find out vulnerable contracts at the time of development, but they will not help mitigate the security 
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Appendix 1: Own Code 
 
Code added to Smartbugs: 
 
dict = {} 
def calculate_average_time(tool,time): 
    if tool in dict: 
        dict[tool].append(time) 
    else: 
        dict[tool] = [time] 
 
    print('\n----Average Time and Total calculations----------------------------------\n') 
    for k,v in dict.items(): 
        print("Tool: "+k+", Total calculations: "+str(len(v))+", Average Time: "+str(sum(v)/len(v))+" seconds") 
    print('\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------\n') 
 
